By: James B. Sherman, Esq. 

Most employers in Minnesota know that the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) prohibits employment discrimination on several grounds additional to those found in federal law. For example, the MHRA prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual preference, age of majority - 18 and older, not just 40 and older - and marital status. Regarding the latter of these examples, most employers probably know that Minnesota law makes it unlawful for employers to deny employment, promotion, etc., or to discharge someone because of their status as married or unmarried. However, since the MHRA was amended in 1988, the statute defines prohibited "marital status" discrimination much more broadly than discrimination based solely on whether or not someone is married. A recent decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court, issued on April 13, 2011, illustrates the breadth of what may constitute unlawful marital status discrimination under the MHRA. The results might surprise some employers.

By way of background, the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) has prohibited employment discrimination because of a person's marital status since 1973. However, the original statute did not define what aspects of marital status deserved protection under the MHRA; that was left to the courts. Thus, in one case - Kraft, Inc. v. State - an employer's anti-nepotism policy that barred full-time employment to anyone married to a current employee of the company was deemed to violate the MHRA. However, in another case - Cybyske v. Indpt. School Dist. No. 196 - the court dismissed a claim that the plaintiff was not hired because of the political beliefs and views of her husband. The court determined this claim was too far removed from discrimination "directed at the institution of marriage itself" to constitute unlawful discrimination because of marital status.

Four years later, in 1988, the state legislature amended the MHRA to overrule the ruling in Cybyske and expressly defined "marital status" for purposes of prohibited discrimination, as follows:

"Marital status" means whether a person is single, married, remarried, divorced, separated, or a surviving spouse and, in employment cases, includes protection against discrimination on the basis of identity, situation, actions, or beliefs of a spouse or former spouse." (Emphasis added)

Thus, any adverse employment actions (i.e., refusal to hire, promote, etc. or to discharge, demote, etc.) taken because of any of the above-quoted aspects of "marital status," were made unlawful under the amendments.

Fast forward 23 years to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Taylor v. LSI Corp. of America and we have the Court's first occasion to interpret these legislative amendments. In this case the plaintiff, Taylor, worked at LSI as a sales and marketing coordinator. She eventually wound up marrying the company's president. The arrangement seemed to work both for the Taylors and LSI until a few years later when Mr. Taylor gave notice of his intention to resign as president of the company. Between Mr. Taylor's resignation notice and his last day with LSI, Mrs. Taylor was discharged allegedly due to management's stated concern over the awkward/uncomfortable situation that would exist if she were to remain with the company after her husband resigned.

Taylor sued and when the case reached the Minnesota Supreme Court the issue presented was whether the facts as alleged by the plaintiff (i.e., being fired because her husband resigned) constituted discrimination based on marital status under the MHRA, or did the claim fail because the employer's decision was not "directed at the institution of marriage," as the trial court had held in dismissing the suit? Put another way, could Taylor state a claim of discrimination under the MHRA when it was clear LSI did not discharge her because she was or was not married, divorced, separated, widowed, etc., but allegedly because of what her husband did (resigned as president of the company)?

Deciding in favor of Taylor, the State Supreme Court noted the "extremely broad language" from the 1988 MHRA amendments defining marital status discrimination. Besides making it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of whether or not someone is married, remarried, divorced, separated, or a surviving spouse, the Court held that in employment cases the MHRA as amended also bars discrimination on the basis of all of the following:

• The identity of the person's spouse or former spouse;

• The situation of the person's spouse or former spouse;

• The actions of the person's spouse or former spouse; and/or

• The beliefs of the person's spouse or former spouse.

Under this definition it was not difficult for the Court to conclude that Taylor could pursue a claim alleging she was discharged for being married to the company president when he resigned. Though the court did not specify, the alleged facts of the case could involve all three of the identity, situation and actions of Taylor's husband as contributing factors in her termination.

What lessons can be taken from this decision? The most obvious lesson involves circumstances where spouses (or former spouses) are employed by the same employer. Employers who find themselves in this situation will want to ensure that no employment decisions for either employee are influenced by anything having to do with the other employee. Basing employment decisions purely on the circumstances of the employee in question will go a long way to protect against marital status discrimination claims. Less obvious are circumstances where the spouse or former spouse is not an employee or may even be deceased. Under the "extremely broad" definition of marital status discrimination recognized by the Court's decision in Taylor v LSI, the MHRA may be violated whenever an employment decision is based on the identity, actions, situation or beliefs of persons who are not employees if they are the spouse or former spouse of the affected employee.

Accordingly, marital status discrimination under the MHRA involves far more than basing employment decisions on whether or not someone is married, divorced, separated, etc. Firing an employee because their spouse or ex-spouse is a convicted axe murderer, drug dealer, thief, etc. is equally unlawful under the MHRA. Bottom line: Minnesota employers should avoid basing employment decisions on virtually anything having to do with an employee or applicant's spouse or ex-spouse, regardless of whether they are dead or alive, employed or unemployed, living within or outside the State of Minnesota. Consult with a knowledgeable employment lawyer for any exceptions.